U bent hier
“Mijn vorige werkgever zegt: die heb je onderhouden tijdens werktijd, dus die is van ons.” Aldus DJ Giel Beelen in het AD vorige week. De ex-werkgever van de DJ claimt eigenaar te zijn van de Facebookpagina, omdat deze onder werktijd werd onderhouden. Mogelijk een reactie op dat akkefietje vorige week met de ‘gehackte’ muziek. Maar het is wel een lastige vraag: van wie ís de Facebookpagina van een bekend persoon?
Data bestaat juridisch niet, roep ik altijd. En dat geldt ook voor Facebook: een Facebookprofiel met updates, foto’s en dergelijke bestaat juridisch niet als zelfstandig ding. Je kunt er dus geen eigenaar van zijn in de zin van de wet; het is niet meer dan een artefact van een dienst geleverd door Facebook Inc. Juridisch stelt het minder voor dan een bioscoopkaartje of kassabon. Dus wat dat betreft zou de vraag zinloos zijn.
Maar specifiek in de werkgever/werknemer relatie is er nog wel een haakje. Die dienst is geleverd onder een contract tussen Facebook Inc en meneer Beelen. Als hij dat contract als werknemer sloot, dan staat het op naam van zijn ex-werkgever de BNNVARA. Wanneer je dan als werknemer daar niet meer werkt, ben je dus niet meer bevoegd om onder het contract handelingen te verrichten, wat een dure manier is om te zeggen dat je dan die pagina niet meer mag updaten.
Wanneer ga je nu een contract aan als werknemer? Een expliciete opdracht is daarvoor niet nodig. Als uit de omstandigheden duidelijk is dat jij én de werkgever dit bedoelde als zakelijke actie, dan is het een contract op naam van de werkgever. Er is dus geen hard criterium, en ook “onder werktijd beheerd” is niet genoeg. Als ik onder werktijd als DJ een roman schrijf, dan is die echt van mij want dat heeft niets met het werk te maken. (Ik kan wel worden berispt voor niet werken onder werktijd.)
Dat je op je eigen naam gebruikt, zou normaal voor mij een belangrijke factor in het voordeel van de werknemer zijn. Ook dat het hier Facebook is en niet een meer zakelijk netwerk zoals Linkedin, zie ik als factor pro werknemer. Maar het is hier iets ingewikkelder, omdat je als Bekende Nederlander juist zákelijk op Facebook moet zijn (daar zitten je fans) en je daarbij ook onder je persoonsnaam naar buiten treedt. Anders gezegd: het onderscheid tussen Giel Beelen privé en Giel Beelen, werknemer BNNVARA, is eigenlijk niet goed te maken.
Er blijft dan weinig anders over dan op de pagina zelf te kijken. En daar zie ik van alles over de zakelijke activiteiten van de DJ, aansluitend bij dingen die op de radio gebeuren. Ik zie zo gauw geen echte privézaken zoals ik die bij een particuliere Facebook zou verwachten. Daardoor krijg ik het gevoel dat de pagina bedoeld is als deel van het werk, en daarmee is goed verdedigbaar dat BNNVARA deze als bedrijfspagina ziet.
Het is natuurlijk nogal vervelend voor Beelen die zo het contact met zijn fans verliest, maar juridisch zie ik geen argumenten om de pagina zelf te mogen houden. Jullie wel?
Afkomstig van de blog Internetrecht door Arnoud Engelfriet. Koop mijn boek!
Today EFF and 56 other civil society organizations have sent an open letter [PDF] to European lawmakers outlining our grave concerns with Article 13 of the proposed new Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, which would impose a new responsibility on Internet platforms to filter content that their users upload. The letter explains:
Article 13 introduces new obligations on internet service providers that share and store user-generated content, such as video or photo-sharing platforms or even creative writing websites, including obligations to filter uploads to their services. Article 13 appears to provoke such legal uncertainty that online services will have no other option than to monitor, filter and block EU citizens’ communications if they are to have any chance of staying in business. ...
Article 13 would force these companies to actively monitor their users' content, which contradicts the "no general obligation to monitor" rules in the Electronic Commerce Directive. The requirement to install a system for filtering electronic communications has twice been rejected by the Court of Justice, in the cases Scarlet Extended (C 70/10) and Netlog/Sabam (C 360/10). Therefore, a legislative provision that requires internet companies to install a filtering system would almost certainly be rejected by the Court of Justice because it would contravene the requirement that a fair balance be struck between the right to intellectual property on the one hand, and the freedom to conduct business and the right to freedom of expression, such as to receive or impart information, on the other.European Commission Foreshadows More Of the Same To Come
Article 13 is bad enough as a copyright filtering mandate. But what makes the proposal even more alarming is that it won't stop there. If we lose the battle against the use of upload filters for copyright, we'll soon see a push for a similar mandate on platforms to filter other types of content, beginning with ill-defined "hate speech" and terrorist content, and ending who knows where. Evidence for this comes in the form of a Communication on Tackling Illegal Content Online, released last month. The Communication states:
Online platforms should do their utmost to proactively detect, identify and remove illegal content online. The Commission strongly encourages online platforms to use voluntary, proactive measures aimed at the detection and removal of illegal content and to step up cooperation and investment in, and use of, automatic detection technologies.
The Communication also talks up the possibility of "so-called 'trusted flaggers', as specialised entities with specific expertise in identifying illegal content," being given special privileges to initiate content removal. However, we already have bodies that have expertise in identifying illegal content. They're called courts. As analyses of the Communication by European Digital Rights (EDRi), the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT), and Intellectual Property Watch point out, shifting the burden of ruling on the legality of content from courts onto private platforms and their "trusted flaggers" will inevitably result in over-removal by those platforms of content that a court would have found to be lawful speech.
The Communication clearly foreshadows future legislative measures as soon as 2018 if no significant progress is made by the platforms in rolling out automated filtering and trusted flagging procedures on a "voluntary" basis. This means that the Communication, although expressed to be non-binding, is not really "voluntary" at all, but rather a form of undemocratic Shadow Regulation by the unelected European Commission. And the passage of the upload filtering mandate in the Digital Single Market Directive would be all the encouragement needed for the Commission to press forward with its broader legislative agenda.The Link Tax Paid To Publishers ... That Publishers Don't Want
The upload filtering mandate in Article 13 isn't the only provision of the proposed Directive that concerns us. Another provision of concern, Article 11, would impose a new "link tax" payable to news publishers on websites that publish small snippets of news articles to contextualize links to those articles. Since we last wrote about this, an interesting new report has come out providing evidence that European publishers—who are the supposed beneficiaries of the link tax—actually oppose it. The report also states:
[T]here is little evidence that the decline in newspaper revenues has anything to do with the activities of news aggregators or search engines (that appear as the primary targets of the new right). In fact, it is widely recognised that there are two reasons for the decline in newspaper revues: changes in advertising practice associated with the Internet (but not especially related to digital use of new material on the Internet); and the decline in subscriptions, which may be in part related to the decision of press publishers to make their products available on the Internet. These are simply changes in the newspaper market that have little, if anything, to do with the supposed "unethical" free riding of other internet operators.
The European Parliament's Civil Liberties (LIBE) Committee is due to vote on its opinion on the Digital Single Market proposals this Thursday, 19 October. Although it's not the final vote on these measures, it could be the most decisive one, since a recommendation for deletion of Article 11 and Article 13 at the LIBE committee would be influential in convincing the lead committee (the Legal Affairs or JURI Committee) to follow suit.
Digital rights group OpenMedia has provided a click-to-call tool that you can use, available in English, French, German, Spanish, and Polish, to express your opposition to the upload filtering mandate and the link tax. If you are European or have European friends or colleagues, please do take this opportunity to speak out and oppose these proposals, which could change the Internet as we know it in harmful and unnecessary ways.
A key legal linchpin for the National Security Agency’s vast Internet surveillance program is scheduled to disappear in under 90 days. Section 702 of FISA—enacted in 2008 with little public awareness about the scope and power of the NSA’s surveillance of the Internet—supposedly directs the NSA’s powerful surveillance apparatus toward legitimate foreign intelligence targets overseas. Instead, the surveillance has been turned back on us. Despite repeated inquiries from Congress, the NSA has yet to publicly disclose how many Americans are impacted by this surveillance.
With the law’s sunset looming, Congress is taking up the issue. The USA Liberty Act, introduced by Representatives Goodlatte (R-Va.), John Conyers (D-Mich.), Jim Sensenbrenner (R-Wis.), and others, may offer a chance to address some of the worst abuses of NSA Internet surveillance even as it reauthorizes some components of the surveillance for another six years.
But the first draft of the bill falls short.
The bill doesn’t effectively end the practice of “backdoor searching,” when government agents—including domestic law enforcement not working on issues of national security—search through the NSA-gathered communications of Americans without any form of warrant from a judge. It doesn’t institute adequate transparency and oversight measures, and it doesn’t deal with misuse of the state secrets privilege, which has been invoked to stave off lawsuits against mass surveillance.
Perhaps most importantly, the bill won’t curtail the NSA’s practices of collecting data on innocent people.
The bill does make significant changes to how and when agents can search through data collected under 702. It also institutes new reporting requirements, new defaults around data deletion, and new guidance for amicus engagement with the FISA Court. But even these provisions do not go far enough.
Congress has an opportunity and a responsibility to rein in NSA surveillance abuses. This is the first time, since 2013 reporting by the Washington Post and the Guardian changed the worldwide perception of digital spying, that Congress must vote on whether to reauthorize Section 702. Before this debate moves ahead, leaders in the House Judiciary Committee should fix the shortcomings in this bill.The Problems of 702
Section 702 is supposed to give the NSA authority to engage in foreign intelligence collection. The NSA is only allowed to target non-Americans located outside U.S. borders. This legal authority has been the basis for two controversial data collection programs:
- Upstream surveillance: data collection that siphons off copies of digital communications directly from the “Internet backbone,” the high-capacity fiber-optic cables run by telecommunications companies like AT&T that transmit the majority of American digital communications.
- PRISM (also known as “downstream surveillance”): data collection gathered from the servers of major Internet service providers, such as Google, Facebook, and Apple.
These programs flourished under President Bush and President Obama. As the Washington Post reported, their NSA director took an expansive view on data collection:
“Rather than look for a single needle in the haystack, his approach was, ‘Let’s collect the whole haystack,’ ” said one former senior U.S. intelligence official who tracked the plan’s implementation. “Collect it all, tag it, store it. . . . And whatever it is you want, you go searching for it.”
Unfortunately, the Liberty Act won’t address most of these fundamental problems. Here’s an analysis of some of the key provisions in the bill, and we’ll have future articles exploring specific topics in more detail.Leaving the Backdoor Ajar
Agents for the NSA, CIA, and FBI have long rifled through the communications collected under Section 702, which include American communications, as well as the communications of foreigners who have no connection to crime or national security threats. With no approval from a judge, they’re able to search this database of communications using a range of personal identifiers, then review the contents of communications uncovered in those searches. Government agents can then use these results to build a case against someone, or they may simply review it without prosecution.
Ordinarily, if the FBI wants to intercept or collect a U.S. person’s communications, they must first get permission from a judge. But as a result of Section 702, the FBI today reviews NSA-collected communications of U.S. persons without permission from a judge. Privacy advocates call this the “backdoor search loophole.”
This practice violates the Fourth Amendment right to privacy against unreasonable searches and seizures. And it can be difficult to prove because government agents may not disclose when they use evidence from the 702 database in prosecutions or for any other purposes.
The first draft of the Liberty Act doesn’t resolve the problem. It still allows government agents—including domestic law enforcement agents—to query the 702 database, including using identifiers associated with American citizens, such as the email address of an American. The main improvement is that when an agent conducts a query looking for evidence of a crime, she must obtain a probable cause warrant from a judge to access the results.
But the warrant requirement is limited due to a number of troubling carve-outs. First, this court oversight requirement won’t be triggered except for those searches conducted to find evidence of a crime. No other searches for any other purposes will require court oversight, including when spy agencies search for foreign intelligence, and when law enforcement agencies explore whether a crime occurred at all.
Metadata—how many communications are sent, to whom, at what times—won’t require court oversight at all. In fact, the Liberty Act doesn’t include the reforms to metadata queries the House had previously passed (which unfortunately did not pass the Senate). In the Massie-Lofgren Amendment, which passed the House twice, agents who conducted queries for metadata would be required to show the metadata was relevant to an investigation. That relevance standard is not in the Liberty Act.
Finally, some may interpret vague language in the bill as putting responsibility for assessing probable cause in the hands of the Attorney General, the main governmental prosecutor, rather than in the hands of the FISA Court. This language should be clarified to ensure the judge’s role in approving the applications is the same as in other FISA proceedings.Targeting Procedures
The bill will require the NSA to exercise “due diligence in determining whether a person targeted is a non-United States person reasonably believed to be located outside of the United States,” and requires agents to consider the “totality of the circumstances” when making that evaluation.
At face value, this sounds promising. We do want the NSA to exercise due diligence when evaluating targets of surveillance. However, this provision is more of a fig leaf than a real fix, because even if targeting is improved, it won’t resolve the problem of Americans’ communications being collected. Right now, countless Americans are surveilled through so-called “incidental collection.” This means that while the official target was a non-American overseas, American communications are swept up as well. Even though Americans were never the intended “target,” their emails, chats, and VOIP calls end up in a database accessible to the NSA, FBI, and others. Tightening up targeting won’t address this problem.
In addition, the bill doesn’t change the NSA’s practice of intercepting communications of countless innocent foreigners outside the United States. People outside our national borders are not criminals by default and should not be treated as if they were. If the United States wants to uphold our obligations to human rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, we must respect the basic privacy and dignity of citizens of other countries. That means not vacuuming up as many communications as possible for all foreigners overseas. This is an especially pressing issue now, as the European Union decides whether to limit how European data can be held by American companies. The recently enacted Privacy Shield falls short of the privacy commitments enshrined in European law.Retention of Communications
After the NSA uses Section 702 to collect vast quantities of communications, the NSA stores these records for years to come. Every day the NSA holds these sensitive records is a day they can be misused by rogue government employees or deployed by agency leadership in new ways as part of inevitable “mission creep.” That’s why privacy advocates call for legislation that would require the NSA to purge these Section 702 communications by a fixed deadline, except for specific communications reasonably determined by analysts to have intelligence or law enforcement value.
Unfortunately, the Liberty Act does not solve this problem. Rather, it would only require that if the NSA determines that a communication lacks foreign intelligence value, then the NSA must purge it within 90 days. However, it’s unclear how often the NSA reviews its collected data to assess its foreign intelligence value. Since the bill requires no review, this provision may have little practical effect.Whistleblowers Left Unprotected
Whistleblowers like Thomas Drake, Mark Klein, Bill Binney, and Edward Snowden were fundamental to the public’s understanding of NSA surveillance abuses. But they risked their careers and often their freedom in the process. The United States has a pressing need to improve protections for whistleblowers acting in the public good—including federal contractors who may be witness to wrongdoing.
The Liberty Act includes a section that would extend certain whistleblower protections to federal contractors. However, these protections only apply to “lawful disclosure” to a handful of government officers, such as the Director of National Intelligence. It does not provide any protection when a whistleblower speaks to the media or to advocacy organizations such as EFF.
Furthermore, the bill only protects whistleblowers against “personnel action,” so whistleblowers could still face criminal prosecution. The Espionage Act—a draconian law from 1917 with penalties including life in prison or the death penalty—has become the tool de jour to intimidate and punish public-interest whistleblowers. The Liberty Act will provide whistleblowers no protection against prosecution under the Espionage Act.
To make matters worse, the bill also creates new penalties for the unauthorized removal or retention of classified documents, including when done negligently. This will likely be another tool used to go after whistleblowers. This section of the bill must be significantly narrowed or cut.Ending “About” Collection
The National Security Agency announced in April the end of a controversial form of spying known colloquially as “about surveillance.” After collecting data directly from the backbone of the Internet and doing a rough filter, government agents use key selector terms about targeted persons to search through this massive trove of data. In the past, these searches would not merely search the address lines (the to and from section of the communications) but would directly search the full contents of the communications, so that any mention of a selector in the body of the email would be returned in the results. Thus, communications of people who were not surveillance targets, and were not communicating with surveillance targets, were included in the results.
The NSA was unable to find a way to conduct this type of “about” searching while adhering to restrictions imposed by the FISA Court, and thus the agency discontinued the practice in April. However, this is currently a voluntary policy, and the agency could begin again. In fact, NSA Director Mike Rogers testified before Congress in June that he might recommend that Congress reinstitute the program in the future.
The Liberty Act codifies the end of “about surveillance.” It provides that the NSA must limit its targeting “to communications to or from the targeted person.” While the NSA’s upstream program will still collect the communications passing through the Internet backbone, including the communications of vast numbers of innocent U.S. and foreign citizens, the end of “about” surveillance will reduce the number of communications stored in the 702 database.Other Positive Changes in the Bill
Critically, unlike some other pending reauthorization proposals, the Liberty Act will maintain Section 702’s “sunset,” ensuring that Congress must review, debate, and vote on this issue again in six years. Permanent reauthorization, which we strongly oppose, would prevent this Congressional check on executive overreach.
The Liberty Act makes some other modest improvements to the NSA’s surveillance practices. It gives the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board the ability to function without an appointed chair, which has been a persistent problem with this accountability body. It also puts in place new reporting requirements.
The bill would require the FISA Court to appoint an amicus curiae to assist it in reviewing the annual “certification” from the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence regarding the NSA’s Section 702 targeting and minimization procedures. This would be a helpful check on this currently one-sided process. However, the FISA Court could dispense with this check whenever it found the amicus appointment “not appropriate” – a nebulous test that could neuter this new safeguard.A Few More Missing Pieces
Many vital fixes to the worst surveillance abuses of the NSA are missing from this bill.
Congress should clear a pathway for individuals to contest privacy abuses by the NSA. This includes ensuring that Americans whose data may have been “incidentally” collected by the NSA under Section 702 have legal standing to go to court to challenge this violation of their constitutional rights. It also requires an overhaul of the controversial state secrets privilege, a common law doctrine that government agencies have invoked to dismiss, or refuse to provide evidence in, cases challenging mass surveillance.
Congress should crack down on “incidental collection,” and ensure the communications of innocent Americans are not collected in the first place.
Finally, we need to empower the FISA court to review and approve the targets of NSA surveillance. Currently, the NSA receives only general guidelines from the FISA Court, with no individual review of specific targets and selector terms. This means the NSA has little obligation to defend its choice of targets, resulting in little recourse when agents are over-inclusive of inappropriate targets.Next steps for the Judiciary Committee
Congress still has time to get this right. This bill hasn’t gone to markup yet, and the Judiciary Committee is likely to amend the bill before passing it to the floor. We urge the Judiciary Committee members to make changes to the bill to address these shortcomings.
As public awareness of NSA surveillance practices has grown, so too has public outrage. That outrage is the fuel for meaningful change. We passed one bill to begin reining in surveillance abuses in 2015, and from that small victory springs the political will for the next, more powerful reform. Join EFF in calling on Congress to rein in these surveillance abuses, and defend privacy for Internet users of today and in the years to come.
With assistance from Adam Schwartz.
Professor Xiaoxing Xi, a physics professor with Temple University, was the subject of government surveillance under a FISA order. During September's Color of Surveillance Hill briefing, Professor Xi told his story of the devastating impact of government surveillance on his life.%3Ciframe%20width%3D%22560%22%20height%3D%22315%22%20src%3D%22https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube-nocookie.com%2Fembed%2F4i6r454XxFc%3Frel%3D0%26autoplay%3D1%22%20frameborder%3D%220%22%20allowfullscreen%3D%22%22%3E%3C%2Fiframe%3E Privacy info. This embed will serve content from youtube-nocookie.com
Professor Xi faced a prosecution that was later dropped because there was no evidence that he had engaged in any wrongdoing. Ever since this invasive surveillance against him, he has become an outspoken advocate against race-based surveillance and prosecution.
We asked Professor Xi to elaborate on the surveillance against him and the effect it had on him, his family, and his scientific work.
Q: People assume their private communications are not visible to others, but it's become more and more clear that the government is surveilling countless Americans. How did you feel when you learned that the government had been reading your private emails, listening to your private phone calls, and conducting electronic surveillance?
It was frightening. I knew from the beginning that their charges against me were completely wrong, but we were fearful till the end that they might twist something I wrote in my emails or something I said over the phone to send me to jail. I also felt like I was being violated. When you lose your privacy, it's like being forced to walk around naked.
Q: Does knowing you had been surveilled cause you concern now, years later? Do you still worry you're under surveillance?
Yes, my whole family are still seriously concerned about our emails being read and phone calls being listened to. People tell us that it is very unlikely we are still being surveilled, and they are probably right. Once violated, it is very difficult to shake off the fear. We watch every word we write and say, so that we don't give them excuses to "pick bones out of an egg," and life is very stressful like this.
Q: Your children were still young when this happened, especially your daughter. How did your family feel about all this? How were they affected?
They were shaken by guns being pointed at them and seeing me snatched away in handcuffs. Everyone was traumatized by this experience, like the sky was falling upon us. My wife was very courageous, trying to shield the children from the harm, even though she herself was under tremendous stress. My elder daughter was a chemistry major, and now she works in a civil rights organization trying to raise the awareness of people about the injustices immigrants face. My younger daughter tries to go about her life like nothing has happened, but we worry about the long term effect on her.
Q: How has your scientific work been affected by this horrible and unjust surveillance and prosecution?
It damaged my scientific research significantly. My reputation is now tainted and the opportunities for me to advance in the scientific community are more limited. My current research group is just a tiny fraction of what I used to have. In addition, I worry about routine academic activities being misconstrued by the government and I am scared to put my name on forms required for obtaining funding and managing research.
Add your voice. Join EFF in speaking out against mass surveillance.
On the last day to act on legislation in 2017, California Gov. Jerry Brown signed a bill creating a firewall between the state's data and any attempt by the federal government to create lists, registries, or databases based on a person's religion, nationality, or ethnicity.
S.B. 31 was one of the earliest bills introduced by the legislature to oppose discriminatory policies floated by Pres. Donald Trump and his surrogates during the 2016 campaign. S.B. 31, authored by Sen. Ricardo Lara, was a direct response to Trump's and his surrogates' support of a so-called "Muslim Registry." Although the bill places California at odds with the White House, both parties in the California Senate unanimously approved the bill, as did an overwhelming bipartisan majority in the Assembly.
The bill prohibits state and local government officials from sharing personal data with the federal government for the purposes of creating these kinds of registries or using government resources to support law enforcement or immigration enforcement activities based on religious beliefs, practices, or affiliations, or national origin or ethnicity. Police authorities are also prohibited from investigating or enforcing a requirement to register with such a registry.
In addition, the legislation would prohibit the state and local law enforcement agencies from collecting information on a person's religious beliefs or practices, except in two narrow situation: when there is a "clear nexus" between criminal activity and the religious information, or when there is a need to provide religious accommodations (e.g. providing Kosher or Halal food in a detention setting).
With S.B. 31, Californians have ensured that the state does not repeat the mistakes of the last century, when the U.S. Census Bureau shared confidential data with the military for the purposes of interning Japanese Americans during World War II.
We are grateful to Sen. Lara for championing this important legislation, Gov. Brown for signing it, and to the 700 EFF supporters who emailed their legislators to defend our data from being used to persecute our communities.
Instagram muss seine Nutzungsbedingungen ändern. Verbraucherschützer haben Klauseln abgemahnt, mit denen der Dienst weitgehende Rechte an den Daten und Inhalten der Nutzer beanspruchte. Wer Fotos hochlädt, soll nun nicht mehr befürchten müssen, sie könnten beliebig verwendet oder verkauft werden.
Die Verbraucherschützer hatten Instagram abgemahnt, weil sie mehrere Bestimmungen in den Nutzungsbedingungen für unzulässig hielten. Instagram habe sich daraufhin bereit erklärt, eine Reihe an Klauseln nicht mehr zu verwenden, wie der Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband (VZBV) heute bekanntgab.
Die 19 Klauseln, die Instagram jetzt nicht mehr verwenden darf, lassen sich fünf Bereichen zuordnen, wie VZBV-Referent Heiko Dünkel auf Nachfrage von iRights.info erläutert:
- Die Nutzer sollten sich Schiedsverfahren vor Gerichten in Kalifornien unterwerfen.
- Nutzungsrechte an Fotos, die die Nutzer Instagram einräumten, waren nahezu grenzenlos.
- Instagram behielt sich vor, den Zugriff auf den Dienst „aus beliebigem Grund und ohne vorherige Ankündigung“ zu sperren.
- Instagram hatte beansprucht, „bestimmte Informationen“ über die Nutzer mit Dritt-Werbepartnern zu teilen, ohne eine klare Einwilligung zu besitzen. Als Beispiel nannte Instagram Cookie-Daten.
- Instagram wollte eine Haftung des Dienstes umfassender ausschließen, als es nach deutschem Recht erlaubt wäre.
Bei den von Instagram beanspruchten Nutzungsrechten monierten die Verbraucherschützer, der Dienst könne damit letztlich Dritten zu beliebigen Zwecken Rechte an den Fotos einräumen, ohne den jeweiligen Nutzer fragen oder vergüten zu müssen. Theoretisch denkbar sei etwa, dass Instagram die Fotos für Werbezwecke oder an Fotoagenturen verkaufe.
Zwar dürfte ein solcher Verkauf in der Praxis unwahrscheinlich sein, für die Verbraucherschützer ist aber entscheidend, dass die verwendeten Klauseln ihn nicht ausschließen. Wie auch Gerichte beim Streit um Geschäftsbedingungen gehen sie von derjenigen Lesart aus, die am kundenfeindlichsten wäre.
Für neue Nutzungsbedingungen hat die Facebook-Tochter jetzt Zeit bis zum 2. November, für Änderungen beim Datenschutz bis Ende des Jahres. Instagram hat gegenüber dpa bestätigt, dass man bereits an neuen Nutzungsbedingungen arbeite.
Een lezer vroeg me:Bij de afgelopen algemene ledenvergadering van onze vereniging bleek iemand stiekem beeld- en geluidsopnamen te hebben gemaakt. Toen hij daarop aangesproken werd, verdedigde hij zich met het argument dat hij bewijs wilde verzamelen van wat er werd gezegd, omdat hij de notulen niet vertrouwde. Staat hij in zijn recht?
In principe heb je inderdaad het recht om zelfstandig bewijs te vergaren van wat er op een vergadering wordt gezegd. De klassieke manier was je eigen aantekeningen van het gesprek te maken, maar daarmee sta je natuurlijk niet heel sterk als de officiële notulen iets anders zeggen. Geluidsopnamen zijn sterker, en helemaal als je er beeld bij hebt.
Het opnemen van beeld en geluid in een vergadering is juridisch echter problematisch. Een ALV is meestal een besloten gebeurtenis, en de wet is vrij streng in stiekem maken van opnames in zo’n situatie. Het stiekem maken van afbeeldingen van mensen is bijvoorbeeld strafbaar (art. 139f Strafrecht), net als het stiekem afluisteren van gesprekken (art. 139a Strafrecht), hoewel bij dat laatste je niet strafbaar bent als deelnemer. Kort en goed: de camera moet worden gemeld maar de microfoon mag stiekem aan.
Wel zal zo’n opname vallen onder de Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens, en straks de Algemene Verordening Gegevensbescherming. Beeld en geluid maken waarop mensen herkenbaar te zien/horen zijn, vormt een verwerking van persoonsgegevens. En omdat die meer is dan een zuiver huishoudelijke vastlegging, moet je je daarbij gewoon aan de regels uit de wet houden. (Ja, ook als je zegt dat dit een journalistieke verwerking is.)
Toestemming is niet perse nodig, maar als je zonder toestemming deze opnames maakt dan moet je wel een duidelijke rechtvaardiging hebben én doen wat je kunt om de privacyimpact bij andere mensen te minimaliseren. Publiceren van die beelden zal dus in principe niet kunnen, maar stukjes als bewijs overleggen bij een geschil kan denk ik wel. Daarnaast moet je de beelden natuurlijk veilig opslaan tegen datalekken, en moet je mensen informeren over wat je doet met de beelden.
Alles bij elkaar denk ik dat het nog knap lastig wordt om dit goed te doen als individueel lid. Misschien is het dan ook beter om de ALV te verzoeken standaard geluidsopnames te maken die de secretaris goed bewaart, zodat bij geschillen dingen teruggeluisterd kunnen worden?
Afkomstig van de blog Internetrecht door Arnoud Engelfriet. Koop mijn boek!
California Police and Civil Liberties Groups Agreed on a Simple Transparency Measure. Gov. Brown Vetoed It Anyway.
California Gov. Jerry Brown used the weekend to veto one of 2017's last remaining bills to shine light on police practices.
S.B. 345 was pretty straightforward: every law enforcement agency would have to upload its policies and training materials to its public website—but only documents that would be available anyway under the California Public Records Act (CPRA). The bill had uncommon support from both law enforcement associations and civil liberties organizations, like EFF and the ACLU of California.
So why did Brown veto it?
"The bill is too broad in scope and vaguely drafted. I appreciate the author's desire for additional transparency of police practices and local law enforcement procedures, but I believe this goal can be accomplished with a more targeted and precise approach," he wrote in his rejection letter [PDF].
We're not quite sure what he's talking about. The bill was elegant and short and specified exactly what documents it applied to: "current standards, policies, practices, operating procedures, and education and training materials that would otherwise be available to the public if a request was made pursuant to the California Public Records Act." If he has a better idea, we'd love to hear it.
Sadly, S.B. 345 was the just last of a series of failures by California leadership to enhance government transparency this session.
The legislature failed to pass S.B. 21, which would have more narrowly shined light on just surveillance technologies. Lawmakers also gutted a measure to penalize agencies that intentionally and improperly stymie public records requests. Yet, lawmakers somehow found the will to pass legislation to exempt even more documents from CPRA. And now that Brown has signed A.B. 492, independent companies that market public record research will have to include about as many disclosures and disclaimers as a pharmaceutical company advertising prescription drugs.
Californians deserve much better. The sun should shine as brightly on our government as it does on our beaches.
Along with the other transparency measures that fell short this session, we mourn the death of S.B. 345. We thank its sponsor, Sen. Steven Bradford, and all the transparency allies who urged the governor to sign this bill.
This blog post was first published in The Hill on September 28, 2017.
The federal government sees the U.S. border as a Constitution-free zone. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) claims that border officers—from Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)—can freely ransack travelers’ smartphones and laptops and the massive troves of highly personal information they contain. This practice is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy and free speech rights. Congress can and should fix this problem by enacting the bipartisan Protecting Data at the Border Act (S. 823 and H.R. 1899).
The need for reform is urgent. In the last two years, DHS more than tripled the number of border device searches. It conducted about 8,500 in fiscal year 2015, about 19,000 in fiscal year 2016, and is on track to conduct 30,000 in fiscal year 2017. DHS’s written policies specify that border officers may search electronic devices “with or without individualized suspicion.”
Innocent Americans from all walks of life have been forced to turn over and/or unlock their devices for data searches at the border. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) recently filed suit against the government on behalf of 11 Americans whose devices were searched without a warrant at the border. None of the plaintiffs have been subsequently charged with any violation of law.
Our smartphones and laptops contain our emails, text messages, photos and browsing history. They document our travel patterns, shopping habits and reading preferences. They expose our love lives, health conditions, and religious and political beliefs. They reveal whom we know and associate with. The EFF/ACLU lawsuit argues that warrantless devices searches at the border violate travelers’ rights to privacy under the Fourth Amendment, and freedom of speech and press, private association, and anonymity under the First Amendment.
The Protecting Data at the Border Act was introduced in April by Sens. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), and Rand Paul (R-Ky.), Reps. Jared Polis (D-Colo.), Blake Farenthold (R-Texas), and Adam Smith (D-Wash). It would protect our digital privacy and free speech rights in several important ways.
First, the bill would require government officials to obtain a judicial warrant based on probable cause before accessing the contents of an electronic device in the possession of a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident at the U.S. border. There’s nothing new about protecting the significant privacy interests that people have in their electronic devices. In 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in the landmark case Riley v. California that the Fourth Amendment requires police to get a warrant before searching cell phones of arrested persons, stating that: “With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many Americans the privacies of life.”
Second, the bill would prohibit border officers from denying entry into or exit from the United States by a citizen or green card holder if they refuse to provide their device password or unlock their device.
Third, the bill would address the problem of border officers coercing travelers into letting officers search their devices. Officers wear uniforms, carry weapons, restrict travelers in unfamiliar areas, and seize their passports. Travelers are often exhausted after a lengthy international trip, or in danger of missing a connecting flight. Officers ask pointed questions, such as: “If you have nothing to hide, then why don’t you let me search your phone?” When a traveler complies, officers may later claim that the travelers voluntarily “consented” to the search. The bill would require border officers to notify travelers—before requesting consent to search their devices—that they have the right to refuse. The bill also would require any consent to be written.
Fourth, the bill would require border officers to have probable cause that the traveler committed a felony before confiscating their electronic device. Today, border officers confiscate devices for weeks or months at a time, based on no suspicion at all.
Fifth, the bill would forbid border officers from keeping information they obtained from a traveler’s device, unless the information on the device amounts to probable cause that the traveler committed a crime. Under the government’s current policies, border officers may keep information even if there is no suspicion of crime.
Sixth, the bill contains a strong enforcement tool: evidence gathered in violation of these rules would not be admissible in court.
Finally, the bill would require the government to gather and publish statistics regarding border searches of electronic devices, including how officers obtained access (e.g., via warrant or consent), the breakdown of U.S. versus non-U.S. persons whose devices were searched, the countries from which travelers arrived, and the perceived race and ethnicity of travelers subjected to these searches.
The border isn’t a Constitution-free zone. Congress should enact the Protecting Data at the Border Act. Everyone who opposes the federal government’s overreach should contact their senators and representatives, and urge them to co-sponsor and pass the bill.Related Cases: Alasaad v. Duke
Wat is het verschil tussen legal tech en automatisering? Legal tech wordt je opgedrongen van buitenaf, automatisering kies je zelf voor. Die definitie kreeg ik vorige week (dank!). Het laat namelijk zien waar een stevig pijnpunt zit voor de juridische sector: het lijkt er vaak op dat je weinig keuze hebt, je moet mee in de vaart der volkeren en overstappen op nieuwe tools, je laten bijstaan door wizards en voor je het weet staat er een AI robot tegenover je te pleiten.
Dat beeld van die pleitende robot is een hardnekkige. Het is natuurlijk een algemene zorg, dat robots banen gaan inpikken. En een belofte (dreigement?) van legal tech is natuurlijk ook dat juridische werkzaamheden door robots en AIs overgenomen gaan worden. Maar hier wreekt zich een ander verschil tussen legal tech en automatisering.
Automatisering – in ieder geval in de juridische sector – is in principe niets meer of minder dan het automatisch doen van wat voorheen met de hand werd gedaan. Niet meer met pen je pleidooi schrijven maar typen, of met de tekstverwerker. Een sjabloon invullen in Wordperfect in plaats van handmatig de lege plekken zoeken. Een brief faxen in plaats van per post versturen. Op trefwoorden zoeken in een elektronische database in plaats van te bladeren in gelabelde bakken. Dat werk.
Legal tech is anders, het is gericht op echt iets nieuws. Transformeren van de manier van werken in de juridische sector. De inhoud van het werk wordt anders. En daarbij zijn AI en robots belangrijke trefwoorden, want daarmee is het mogelijk het werk inhoudelijk anders aan te pakken. Maar dat betekent niet dat AIs ineens gaan pleiten of onderhandelen zoals wij mensen dat doen.
Ik moet dan altijd denken aan de woorden van computerwetenschapper Edsger Dijkstra: The question of whether Machines Can Think… is about as relevant as the question of whether Submarines Can Swim. Machines werken fundamenteel anders. Ze kunnen teksten analyseren, data minen en correlaties aanwijzen. Die kunnen relevant zijn om beslissingen te nemen, maar het proces dat je dan volgt is onvergelijkbaar met de traditionele werkwijze. Een AI zou bijvoorbeeld bij een zaak vergelijkbare precedenten kunnen zoeken en concluderen dat in 90% van de gevallen de zaak verloren is, maar drijft dan puur op statistische vergelijkbaarheid. Een mens kan andere factoren zien, zoals hoe gevoelig het onderwerp tegenwoordig ligt, de verhouding van partijen en ga zo maar door.
De transformatie zit hem er dus niet in dat een AI of robot gaat doen wat een mens deed. Het is een stapje terug, een andere manier van werken om tot het gewenste resultaat te komen. Een voorbeeld uit de sector is de rechtsbijstandsverzekeraar. Die pakt zaken niet perse aan zoals een advocaat: we hebben een recht, ik ga het halen. Een verzekeraar zal rustig uit eigen zak de klant betalen waar die recht op heeft, als dat netto goedkoper is dan een procedure voeren. (Uiteraard komt dat via de premies weer terug, maar dat terzijde.) Dat is een wezenlijk andere manier van een zaak bekijken.
Ik denk dus dat dit soort ontwikkelingen niet het einde zullen betekenen van de traditionele juridische dienstverlening. Onderdelen zullen veranderen, worden overgenomen door legal tech diensten. Dat verschuift het accent voor de advocaat en andere dienstverlenende mensen.
Afkomstig van de blog Internetrecht door Arnoud Engelfriet. Koop mijn boek!
Gov. Jerry Brown has signed A.B. 90, a bill that EFF advocated for to bring additional accountability and transparency to the various shared gang databases maintained by the State of California. With a campaign organized by a broad coalition of civil liberties organizations—such as Youth Justice Coalition, National Immigration Law Center, Urban Peace Institute, among others—the much needed reform was passed.Why Reform was Desperately Needed
The California State Auditor found the state’s gang databases to be riddled with errors, containing records on individuals who should never have been included in the first place and information that should been purged a long time ago. The investigation also found that the system lacks basic oversight safeguards, and went as far as saying that due to the inaccurate information in the database, it’s crime-fighting value was “diminished.”What the Reform Brings
The legislation brings a broad package of reforms. It codifies new standards and regulations for operating a shared gang database, including audits for accuracy and proper use. The bill would also create a new technical advisory committee comprised of all stakeholders—including criminal defense representatives, civil rights and immigration experts, gang-intervention specialist, and a person personally impacted because of being labeled as a gang member—as opposed to just representatives from law enforcement. Further, the legislation would ensure that the criteria for inclusion in the database and how long the information is retained is supported by empirical research.
Today, California has passed common-sense reforms that were desperately needed to protect its residents’ civil liberties. Californians should be proud.
At EFF, we see endless attempts to misuse copyright law in order to silence content that a person dislikes. Copyright law is sadly less protective of speech than other speech regulations like defamation, so plaintiffs are motivated to find ways to turn many kinds of disputes into issues of copyright law. Yesterday, a federal appeals court rejected one such ploy: an attempt to use copyright to get rid of a negative review.
The website Ripoff Report hosts criticism of a variety of professionals and companies, who doubtless would prefer that those critiques not exist. In order to protect platforms for speech like Ripoff Report, federal law sets a very high bar for private litigants to collect damages or obtain censorship orders against them. The gaping exception to this protection is intellectual property claims, including copyright, for which a lesser protection applies.
One aggrieved professional named Goren (and his company) went to court to get a negative review taken down from Ripoff Report. If Goren had relied on a defamation claim alone, the strong protection of CDA 230 would protect Ripoff Report. But Goren sought to circumvent that protection by getting a court order seizing ownership of the copyright from its author for himself, then suing Ripoff Report’s owner for copyright infringement. We filed a brief explaining several reasons why his claims should fail, and urging the court to prevent the use of copyright as a pretense for suppressing speech.
Fortunately, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agreed that Ripoff Report is not liable. It ruled on a narrow basis, pointing out that the person who originally posted the review on Ripoff Report gave the site’s owners irrevocable permission to host that content. Therefore, continuing to host it could not be an infringement, even if Goren did own the copyright.
Goren paid the price for his improper assertion of copyright here: the appeals court upheld an award of over $100,000 in attorneys’ fees. The award of fees in a case like this is important both because it deters improper assertion of copyright, and because it helps compensate defendants who choose to litigate rather than settling for nuisance value simply to avoid the expense of defending their rights.
We’re glad the First Circuit acted to limit the ways that private entities can censor speech online.
A hallmark of the new generation of trade agreements under negotiation, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), is the inclusion of chapters on e-commerce or digital trade. But interest in using trade agreements to address issues such as data localization, disclosure of software source code, and platform safe harbors, isn’t restricted to these regional trade negotiations.
The same issues have also been raised at the international level at bodies such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the World Economic Forum (WEF). Recent reports from some of these bodies highlight some serious shortcomings in the way that these digital issues are being shoehorned into new trade agreements without adequate transparency and consultation.UNCTAD Information Economy Report 2017
Last week UNCTAD released the 2017 edition of its Information Economy Report (PDF). The annual publication acknowledges that a growing number of countries are adopting disincentives or barriers to processing, storage and transfer of data, which are driving the push to address these barriers through trade agreements. It suggests that harmonization and interoperability of national data protection regimes could help to to find an appropriate balance between supporting processes that allow the transfer of data, on the one hand, and addressing concerns related to issues such as privacy and security on the other.
But more significantly the report also criticizes the lack of dialogue between the trade and Internet communities on risks related to data privacy and security, and devotes an entire chapter to exploring the interfaces between trade and Internet governance policy making, including the differences in workings and expectations of the two communities. The chapter stresses the need for aligning trade processes with multi-stakeholder values such as transparency, openness, and inclusive peer-to-peer participation by any interested party on an equal-footing. It recommends a bottom-up agenda-setting and iterative multi-stage consultation processes to address Internet-related issues, such as those being proposed for the digital trade chapter of NAFTA. EFF’s Open Digital Trade Network and our Brussels Declaration on Trade and the Internet that call upon governments to make trade policymaking on Internet issues more transparent and accountable are explicitly referenced in the report.
In contrast to the hard law-making approach that the U.S. Trade Representative is bringing to the NAFTA negotiations, the report draws upon a framework proposed by the World Economic Forum (WEF) to suggest how norms for e-commerce and the digital economy should be developed. The WEF paper outlines a three-pronged strategy:
- Rather than attempting to agree on binding trade rules, nations should come together to issue declarative statements of mutual interest, based on inputs from stakeholders at the national and global level. Currently efforts are underway to formulate principles and best practices for cooperation across several multilateral mechanisms including the G-7, G-20 and OECD. UNCTAD is put forward as a possible facilitator to help improve synergies amongst these efforts and serve as a platform for formulating soft law rules outside of the pressure of trade negotiations.
- Groups of experts from both the trade and Internet communities should be used to build consensus on key issues. Consensus building is seen as critical for reconciling the multi-stakeholder and traditional trade processes to create an approach that is open, transparent and inclusive at the levels of agenda setting, rules design and implementation, while preserving governments' final decision making authority. One possible model for such expert groups would be based on the Global Commission on Internet Governance and the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC). In tandem with this “inner circle” of experts, a more broadly inclusive range of interested stakeholders could be engaged through online platforms and given opportunities to provide inputs into the work of the inner circle. The UNCTAD E-Commerce Week, a new UNCTAD Intergovernmental Group of Experts on E-Commerce and the Digital Economy, and the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) are recommended as potential avenues for engagement with this outer circle.
- There should also be long-term efforts to open up trade processes so they can benefit from being informed by a broader matrix of analysis and dialogue. Reforms allowing relevant stakeholders to track developments and contribute perspectives and experiences, could increase their buy-in and support for trade policies being developed through trade processes. (EFF has recommended such a set of reforms for U.S. trade policymaking.) The report also recommends an assessment on whether trade process or other mechanisms are more suitable for developing new rules on digital issues not covered under existing trade rules.
All of these recommendations are derived from existing practices drawn from other sectors or in other trade negotiations on the digital economy. For example, the European Commission report on the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA) notes that consultations are an essential part of every trade negotiation, stating, "The interaction between international and local experts, NGOs, business, national government officials, EU officials and other stakeholders leads to a two-way exchange of information."
Although it doesn’t go as far as we would like, the Commission’s approach to the TISA negotiations does provide a stark contrast with those of the NAFTA negotiations. For example, there is a dedicated website which forms an essential part of the consultation process and serves as the main tool for sharing information and updates about the study with stakeholders. The website is used to share drafts of the inception and interim reports and newsletters. It also includes information and documents from civil society dialogues, stakeholder surveys, and summary reports of the TISA negotiation rounds. A dedicated email address exists where stakeholders can send their questions or feedback on the reports.Future of Multilateral Negotiations at the WTO
The UNCTAD and WEF recommendations aren’t relevant only to regional and bilateral negotiations such as those in NAFTA and RCEP, or to plurilateral deals such as TISA, but also to the future of fully multilateral trade discussions at the WTO. In parallel to the release of the Information Economy Report and the first meeting of UNCTAD’s Intergovernmental Group of Experts which took place on October 4-6, Ministers of a select group of WTO member countries gathered in Morocco between 9-10 October to firm up the agenda for negotiations for the WTO’s upcoming Ministerial Conference in December in Buenos Aires, Argentina.
The WTO's biennial summit is the biggest multilateral consultation among nations regarding global trade and investment norms, and the meeting in December will set the discussion and norms for sectoral issues, at least for the next 2 years. Several countries including United States, Australia, Switzerland and Norway have submitted proposals to include global e-commerce rules. Other countries are opposing these proposals on different grounds, which has resulted in a stalemate at the WTO. WTO procedures mandate that any new resolution garner the unanimous support of member-countries before being adopted.
The Morocco "mini-Ministerial" aims to provide political momentum on these long-standing issues and reconcile member nations at loggerheads with each other. The EU has tabled proposals in several areas including e-commerce and recently called upon WTO partners to plan for substantive ambitious outcomes. However other member states are neither as optimistic nor keen on expanding the the multilateral trade order. In a series of tweets on Tuesday, the Indian Commerce and Industry Minister Suresh Prabhu said: "Trying hard to ensure multilateral WTO remain intact, despite huge pressures. Having several bilaterals with all important countries". India is of the view that WTO members need to first deal with the issues which were already under negotiation, before moving on to new ones and urged nations to “avoid further widening and perpetuation of the imbalance between developed and developing countries.”
Around 300 civil society organisations from 150 nations have also raised concerns over the e-commerce liberalisation seemingly gaining priority over traditional issues such as food security. The letter (PDF) addressed to WTO members describes a push for “a dangerous and inappropriate new agenda under the disguising rubric of ‘e-commerce’, while there is no consensus to introduce this new issue during or since the last WTO Ministerial conference.” The letter argues that the WTO is not the proper forum to negotiate e-commerce issues which "have either already been discussed and resolved, or are currently being discussed, in other forums, most of which are more responsive and accountable to public interest concerns than the WTO."
Despite our opposition to the secretive trade agreements of the past, EFF isn't against free trade. We would like to see future trade agreements that work for Internet users and innovators, as well as for traditional trade stakeholders. But as UNCTAD and the WEF recognize, expectations around the levels of transparency and public consultation that can be expected in trade negotiations have changed. This is especially so in relation to Internet-related rules, where prescriptions nominally about commerce and trade can affect citizens’ free speech and other fundamental individual rights. The future for trade negotiations whether they are pursued at bilateral, plurilateral, or multilateral venues lies in the adoption of more transparent, consultative practices. The WEF and UNCTAD recommendations are a welcome exploration of possible reforms to trade negotiation practices to make them fit for the 21st century.
Welchen Stellenwert haben freie Bildungsressourcen für das Teilen von Wissen und wie geht man als Bildungsakteur mit den Creative-Commons-Lizenzen um?
Diese und weitere Fragen stellte mir Birgit Frost in einem Video-Interview, das die Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (BpB) nun veröffentlicht hat. Das Interview entstand im Rahmen des Bildungssalons „Ich bin ganz OER“, den die Werkstatt der BpB im Juni 2017 in Berlin durchführte.
Radio-dj Giel Beelen heeft het begin van zijn nieuwe ochtendshow aangegrepen voor een opvallende promotiestunt, las ik bij de NOS. Hij ‘hackte’ een plaat die werd gedraaid bij zijn oude werkgever 3FM om reclame te maken voor zijn nieuwe programma. “Ik denk dat we effe van iemand het wachtwoord moeten wijzigen”, concludeert de NOS-opvolger. Dus, mag je de muziek hacken bij je ex-werkgever?
De suggestie dat Beelen op afstand ingebroken zou hebben bij zijn ex-werkgever lijkt me wat vergezocht. Logischer lijkt me dat hij gewoon het muziekbestand van een bekend nummer aangepast had om daar na enige seconden intro een eigen boodschap (“Hee, hallo, Giel hier”, en een promo voor zijn nieuwe programma bij de concurrent) te laten horen. Dat aangepaste bestand zet je dan over het origineel heen, en dan is het wachten tot je opvolger het aanklikt. Meer een logisch bommetje dan een computerinbraak.
Het zou natuurlijk strafbaar zijn om in te loggen en op afstand bestanden aan te passen. Je bent immers na einde dienstverband niet meer bevoegd om in te loggen, laat staan om gegevens te wijzigen. Dat je account nog werkt, doet er daarbij niet meer toe.
Als DJ-werknemer ben je natuurlijk wél bevoegd om met die bestanden te werken. Draaien van muziek (en het grappig bewerken daarvan) behoort tot je werk immers. Maar hier wordt dan toch wel een grens overschreden: de aanpassing straalt negatief af op de werkgever, die wordt nu voor gek gezet omdat het lijkt of ze zelf een boodschap spelen om naar de concurrent te gaan.
Strafbaar is dat niet, wel overtreedt het de algemene norm van goed werknemerschap, zeg maar je zorgplicht als personeel. De NOS kan als ex-werkgever hem hierop aanspreken, in theorie zelfs een schadeclaim indienen. Al zal het onderbouwen van de schade nog knap ingewikkeld zijn.
Afkomstig van de blog Internetrecht door Arnoud Engelfriet. Koop mijn boek!
California Gov. Jerry Brown today vetoed A.B. 811, a bill that would have required the government to provide youth in state care—be they juvenile halls or foster homes—with reasonable access to computers and the Internet for educational purposes. In some cases, juveniles would also have been able to use computers to stay in touch with their families and for extracurricular and social activities.
The bill, authored by Assemblymember Mike Gipson, was supported by the Youth Law Center, EFF, and Facebook, and received no opposition when it landed on the governor's desk. More than 250 supporters sent letters to the legislature and the governor asking for this bill to become law.
The good news is that Brown took the concept to heart. In vetoing the bill [PDF], he left the door open for future legislation:
While I agree with this bill's intent, the inclusion of state facilities alone will cost upwards of $15 million for infrastructure upgrades. Also, the reasonable access standard in this bill is vague, and could lead to implementation questions on top of the potentially costly state mandate created by the legislation.
I therefore urge the proponents to revisit the local aspects of this bill in the future, taking these concerns under advisement. In the meantime, I am directing the Department of Juvenile Justice to present a plan in the coming year to provide computer and Internet access as soon as is practicable, and that can be budgeted for accordingly.
EFF welcomes the governor's commitment to bringing the Internet to state juvenile detention facilities through administrative action, and we are glad to see that he's open to new legislation and budgeting for next year. However, we are disappointed that, in a year when he approved a $3.1 billion injection of funds into K-12 schools and community colleges, improving educational opportunities for these at-risk youth was not seen as an immediate statewide priority.
EFF is proud to have lent our technological and policy expertise to this campaign, and we thank the hundreds of Californians who stood up for the rights of youth. We hope you will join us again next year as we continue this campaign to bring Internet access to children in these challenging environments.
Een lezer vroeg me:Mijn vrouw had recent wat geretourneerd bij een webshop, en na twee weken wilde ik eens bellen over de voortgang. Maar dat mocht niet “vanwege de Wet op de privacy”. Mijn vrouw moest toen aan de telefoon mij machtigen en toen kreeg ik wel alle informatie. Doet mij een tikje gek aan, zeker omdat ik iedere vrouwenstem dit had kunnen laten doen. Maar klopt het dat de privacywetgeving verbiedt dat je als echtgenoot mag informeren over elkaars bestellingen?
Op zich is het vanuit de Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens natuurlijk verboden om bestelgegevens van iemand te verstrekken aan een ander. Als ik bel over jouw bestelling, dan mag ik hopen dat ze me dat niet geven.
Binnen een huwelijk ligt dat anders, daar hebben de partners in principe recht op toegang tot elkaars persoonsgegevens. In ieder geval bij bestellingen, omdat ze beiden juridisch aansprakelijk zijn voor de bestelling. Er is dan een recht onder de goede uitvoering overeenkomst (artikel 8 sub b Wbp). Denk ik, ik kan er geen jurisprudentie over vinden.
Wie heel formeel insteekt, zal concluderen dat er een machtiging nodig is van de vrouw naar de man. Dat mag telefonisch, dus op zich doet de winkel het juridisch goed. Alleen pakken ze het wel heel slordig aan met de authenticatie. Beter was geweest als ze hadden gezegd, dit kan alleen per mail, of als ze je dingen ter verificatie hadden gevraagd (naam, adres, bestelnummer, zoiets).
Tegelijk snap ik ook wel dat dat best vervelend is. Zeker omdat je als consument wettelijk het récht hebt om te bellen over je bestelling, dus ze moeten in staat zijn een telefonisch verzoek te authenticeren.
Hebben jullie suggesties hoe je dat het beste kunt doen als winkel?
Afkomstig van de blog Internetrecht door Arnoud Engelfriet. Koop mijn boek!